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review Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 103 º [PDF / Epub] ★ Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 Author David Galula – When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954 France was forced to cope with a varied and adaptable Algerian strategy In this volume originally publisOf the rebellion This groundbreaking work with a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman remains relevant to present day counterinsurgency operatio. David Galula a veritable Cassandra of counter insurgency warfare has thanks to the Ira and Afghan wars risen anew from the dustbin of history to have his pithy observations on the nature and conduct of revolutionary wars considered againThis book is a coda to Galula's magnum opus Counterinsurgency Warfare Both books are well worth reading but Counterinsurgency Warfare is the cogently argued and less anecdotal of the two Many of the vignettes Galula recites in Pacification are idiosyncratic to the Algerian conflict For example the overwhelming material and organizational weaknesses of the FLN their inability to effectively communicate with the masses and their relative isolation are not features of most current insurgencies The ability of the French to effectively seal the Algerian frontiers thus interdicting flow of men and supplies to the FLN is also uniue to that conflict In addition Galula focuses almost exclusively on his pacification campaign in Kabylia only providing occasional glances at the terror campaign being waged in Algiers Oran and elsewhere Very little perspective on the pieds noirs European Algerians was provided and a rather stilted perspective on the Salan coup was offered There was nothing in the book to suggest the impending emergence of the OAS and little was given to suggest that something along the lines of the Evian talks De Gaulle's negotiations with the FLN which ultimately ended the conflict could emerge As this monograph was originally issued by RAND in 1963 and the war ended in 1962 this recounting of events presents a curiously removed perspective RAND evidently reuested a very specific report on Galula's own efforts so perhaps the criticism is somewhat unfairPacification illustrates the method for controlling the population Galula acknowledges Mao here the need for policing providing essential services and dometic security to the population He also repeatedly and candidly states the need for controlling the population and provides several stark examples of his methods He also allude to the reluctance of the military to engage in this sort of endeavor Our military shares this perspective to a greater or lesser extentAbove all what this book does graphically acknowledge is the need for a specific defined focused and consistent political policy toward the insurrection The FLN and I presume the current adversaries the US faces in Southeast Asia grasped that we unlike they are not in the war for the long run He writes One might even say that in this sort of war military action is but a minor facet of the conflict a partial aspect of the operation Give me good policy and I will give you good revolutionary war Cogent advice indeedThe FLN terror campaign coupled with a compelling ideology was seminal in defeating French domestic opinion the real battleground and driving the French from Algeria The French had no ideology to propagandize appeared as colonialists and had inconsistent and vacillating policies which were also unevenly applied As a result of all that they had no theater of their own to present Galula minimizes the extent of the ideological dimension in the text but makes a compelling case for it in the Appendixes of the book Bruce Michael Jenkins RAND's own terrorism expert noted that Terrorism is theater Of course that was perfectly understood by Frances FLN opponents one of whom Ramdane Abane trenchantly observed that One corpse in a jacket is always worth than 20 in uniform which seems to me to convey a perfect understanding of the psychology of the intended audience; the theatrical dimension if you will Yet by and large Galula's adversaries as depicted in the text of Pacification seem in general to be political bumpkins which of course they were not A specific propaganda program was presented in Appendix 3 but if and how this was implemented in Algiers the epicenter of the conflictwas never clarified While Kabilya was Galula's laboratory it was far remote from the real action in France and in the Algerian capital But Galula contends what worked there should work elsewhere tooRegardless of these criticisms this is an important book one which was well deserving of reissue Because of its very narrow perspective the book should be read in conjunction with Counterinsurgency Warfare and for additional insights into the Algerian situation with Alistair Horne's book A Savage War of PeaceBruce Hoffman who wrote the new introduction to Pacification and is himself a terrorism expert noted in Inside Terrorism his 1998 book that terrorism is where politics and violence intersect in the hope of delivering power Galula understood that the need for counterinsurgents to forcibly divorce one from the other in the adversary's camp is the crux of destroying them both

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When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November France was forced to cope with a varied and adaptable Alg. I bought this as part of the reading for an essay on counter terrorism in Algeria so it was very on topic The author was a solider serving the side of France in the conflict and thus describes his own position with regards to combating terrorism and dealing with an insurrectionThere is therefore a modern ring to it clear parallels with Iraw might be drawn but the keen readerI must admit I found this to be a little dry at time altough it was certainly worth reading in placesExcuse a somewhat basic review I read this book months ago and memory fades a bit

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Pacification in Algeria 1956 1958Erian strategy In this volume originally published in David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command at the height. In Pacification in Algeria David Galula describes his largely successful experiences as a company commander and battalion S3XO in Algeria in the late 1950's and draws on these experiences and his earlier exposure to Communist insurgency throughout Asia and the Balkans in order to develop and articulate a theory of COIN Most of the book is a relatively detached and analytical albeit honest discussion of his experience and reaction to events as a company commander in a rather nondescript battalion and AO The reader expecting exciting accounts of desperate battles or tales of derring do will be disappointed not only is combat fleeting but Galula's perspective is about recounting what he thought and did in a campaign planning sense rather than in the here and now tactical space For anybody with than a superficial interest in sub unit operations there is however ample description explanation and analysis of a range of tactical activities and objectives be they kinetic or otherwise Despite the author's obvious scholarly interest in advocating a theoretical approach to COIN it is still relevant and enjoyable reading for tactical level commanders with pressing concerns than wading through dense academic tractsBoth Galula's own actions and embryonic theory explored fully in Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era are persuasively argued here certainly on first reading Pacification in Algeria at a point during a deployment to Afghanistan when I was wondering just how relevant our tactical successes really were Galula's arguments that successfully shooting insurgents was irrelevant unless accompanied by measures to secure and win the support of the population were nothing short of a revelation Galula's specific prescriptions should be treated as a guide to further thinking rather than a template however the reader should note that his theory was largely shaped by uniue and absorbing experiences within his companybattalion AO which were characterised by a relative unity of command on the counterinsurgent side no indigenous government or security partners being mentored here even if higher headuarters focused on traditional institutional perspectives and the wrong metrics for too long sound familiar and a relatively unsophisticated and politically malleable population within the AOOverall essential reading for anybody in or around platoon company or battalion command groups that expect to engage in COIN operations and highly recommended as a pivotal part of the COIN canon of modern western military thought